Chinese Invasion

As summer is here soon we may be getting reports of the dreaded Chinese Snakehead fish.

Snakehead

Invasive species are of course nothing new, but Zebra Mussels and Eurasian Water Millfoil don’t get near the panic reaction that Snakeheads do. In fact, other species are a concern mainly to the nature nut contingent. Snakeheads add the national purity set. And, of course, they come from China, and Chinese markets right here in the U.S. They can walk on land, so they may well flop into your house, devour the kids and replace them with orphaned Chinese girls, and re-program your TIVO to record only Cantonese game shows. Plus, when you ask Chinese how to deal with them they may suggest you eat them, which is disgusting and un-American.

Does China exist?

The question of China’s existence or non-existence in the eyes of foreigners is an old one. At least for the early European explorers China really did exist, and more so than most of the other places they visited. It had a government, a ruler, a national character. They were not primitives. All that changed, of course, and eventually China was not there. That was one of the justifications for the Japanese trying to take Taiwan, and probably other things as well. The Qing court did not do the things that a modern state was expected to do, most notably control territory and provide just justice, and therefore it was free ground for real nations to take over.
The Chinese, of course, also did not see themselves as a nation in the same sense that Westerners did. 中國﹐天下﹐孫中山的”一片散沙”etc. This led to a lot of bickering. Two quotes.

The first is an exchange from the American Philippine Commission’s Opium Committee, which toured Asia in 1903-4 looking into the opium situation. One of the people they interviewed was the Reverend Timothy Richards, who is identified as having been resident in China for thirty-three years, and is pretty clearly seen as speaking for China. (The Commission did have some Chinese merchants speak for China as well, but they were not very articulate.)

Q: Is there any Chinese government?
A: If a viceroy does not obey the central government, he will find himself high and dry. It is a government to that extent. The appointment of all high officials is in the hands of the central government.
(Baumler Modern China and Opium: A Reader p. 60)

This exchange takes place in the context of a discussion of Chinese opium suppression policies. China is not doing enough to reform its people to be considered a true state, but Richards does defend China by saying that there is at least a minimal amount of state structure.

The second is from the American journalist Hallet Abend, who was discussing China’s threat to walk out of the League’s opium control system.

Whatever Chinese delegate there has been at Geneva, whether he represented a government the authority of which did not extend beyond the walls of old Peking or whether he represented a government pretending to rule the whole country, China has seemed to regard the League as an organization to be used for bluff and intrigue.
These delegates in succession have not only refused to give facts concerning the growing amount of opium cultivation and opium smoking in China, but by distortion of facts have sought to place upon Great Britain and Japan the blame for the great quantities of narcotics now consumed in China.
The League has sought to keep China as a satisfied member because the Chinese delegate, after all, was the sole representative of an enormous and thickly populated part of Asia, but it has been farcical to pretend that under present conditions China could participate seriously on questions like opium, disarmament, labor legislation or child welfare.
(New York Times Apr. 21, 1929.)

For Abend a nation is capable of collecting facts (and not lying about them), but also participates in the improvement of its own people. Defining a state is now going away from state formations and towards having something like a public sphere and a citizenry. My question is where China sits today. In the early 20th century a nation was pretty clearly defined as a state with power. Today in the western press there is a lot of talk about how China is on the brink of chaos, how it is a place where the rules of the universe (a Rolex is a Rolex) don’t really apply, businessmen are greedy, etc. All this is despite the fact that China clearly does have a government an army and an economy. Where is the locus of place-ness now? Why are we (Americans rather than academics) so uncomfortable with China?

-China does not fit. This works both culturally and politically. China does not bow before Hollywood, both because of pirated DVDs and because Michelle Yeoh could kick Steven Segal’s ass. China is also the only country in the world that still has a 19th-century power politics relationship with the U.S. China is powerful enough that they can tell the Americans to kiss off, and war is a real possibility in the way it is not with Japan and the E.U. China is an exception in almost every way.

-China does not articulate very well where it is going. 1989 was supposed to be a sign that liberal democracy was coming to China, and while it may yet, China’s future path does not really fit any known model. Many people know what the relationship between an editorial in “Le Monde” and “France” is, but what is the Chinese equivalent? China seems to have lots of power and money, too much in fact, but not enough society and transparency.

A lot of this is of course just laziness on the part of Western elites. China is thinkable, and if it is a bit of a special case it is big enough to be worth the mental effort needed to figure it out. It is also caused in part by poor work on the part of professional China interpreters. So, what exactly is it that makes a place a place, and which of these things does China have?

Intro

Member introduction.

I would like to thank Konrad for his invitation to join up, and say that I look forward to being a part of this blog.
I suppose I should start off with a bit of biography. I sort of drifted into this field as an undergraduate. I started out my career (at Northern Illinois University) as a business major. I had no idea what I wanted to do when I grew up, but I did assume that after college I would get a job, and business seemed to be connected to jobs. After determining that I did not want to be a business major, I switched to History, mostly because I liked the stories (many of them not true, sadly) that Mr Yohe used to tell in High School history class. Really, I was trying to find something that would interest me enough that I would eventually graduate from college, even if I ended up starving afterwards. I spent a couple of very enjoyable years majoring in History that meet after noon. I realized that teaching was the only option if I wanted to eat as a historian, and I had no interest in education classes, so that meant grad school, not that I really knew what that meant. I knew I did not want to do U.S. history, and I knew I did not want to do China. I’m not sure if it was Pearl Buck or James Clavell who gave me this impression, but I had this hazy idea of China as a despotism
that was inhabited by pathetic peasants.
France
was coolMexico was cool. China was not. I took one Chinese history class on the assumption that I should know something about the place. I’m still not entirely sure why I was so interested in that class. This was long enough ago that the lecturer actually read from yellowed notes he had written out in longhand. I’m not quite sure why I liked Chinese history so much. The fact that there was a lot of it helped. All the other places I studied were bits of something larger. China was a host in itself. Also, I thought learning Chinese would be a challenge.

I mention all this in part because it seems completely inadequate. Now I’m an academic and a China person, and it is hard to imagine being anything else, but when I look back the reasons I had at the time seem silly and almost random. Apparently there is a lot of path dependence in what we do. Most of the rest of my life has been shaped by the casual decisions (and stubbornness) of a kid who was uniformed not only about China but also about academia and most other things. My professors probably had some point to a lot of what they were doing, but I had no idea what it was. They tossed out lots of interesting things, and I picked some of them at random and held on to them.

I also mention it because studying China seems to call for a lot of explanation, at least around here. I’ve given versions of the
above a zillion times. There are parts of the world and the U.S. where the coming Chinese century is obvious and dealing with it or profiting from it seem to be things that are well worth doing. The chief question in Western PA is why holes in the ground that used to contain coal no longer contain coal and what can be done about it. Explaining to people why they should care about China is part of what I do, and like most academics I am wound up enough in study in general and in China in particular that it is hard for me to get outside it and explain why anyone else should care.

This ties directly into why anyone should read this blog. Some blogs are worth reading because the people who post to them are interesting Clearly not a reason to read what I write. Some are funny.Some blogs are written by experts who will tell you things any informed citizen needs to know. I suppose my current tendency is to post on things that interest me and assume that occasionally they will intersect with a larger conversation, but mostly it will just be talking to a small group of people, and as often as not only to myself. This is sort of typical for China academics, I think, since we are always part of the narratives that society and academia want to tell. China is too big to be left out (unlike, say, Korea) and we can always get into a
conversation
if we want to. On the other hand we can also go off in our own weird little
sinological
world. I like both approaches, but I suppose that place I like best is somewhere between
I will try to post something about my current work soon, but this is enough of a trial to your patience for the moment. I will also try to figure out Word Press’s formatting a little better

Chinese Civil War Mystery

I’ll do a China-relevant self-introduction later (you can read my Frog in a Well: Japan self-introduction, if you’re really curious) , but I just ran across a very interesting article via HNN’s Breaking News: The mystery of the only Chinese Army officer buried in Arlington National Cemetary. The grave marker reads “Nia-chien Liu, Major, Chinese Army. October 19, 1946,” and the burial records suggest a Protestant service. Based on the date of death the article says that Liu was likely a Guomindang officer. Historians familiar with OSS/CIA operations in China were consulted, but had little to offer.

So, if anyone’s doing archival research this summer on the Civil War era, keep an eye out!

井底之蛙 Site Launch

Welcome to 井底之蛙, the newest addition to Frog in a Well. This new academic group blog is primarily focused on the study of the history of China, broadly defined, but some of our contributors will be writing from the perspective of other fields.

This is the sister blog to 井の中の蛙, or Frog In a Well – Japan, focusing on Japanese history, and this weblog shares similar goals. Its name 井底之蛙 is a proverb that comes from the writings of Zhuangzi, one of the founders of what we now call Daoism (In the Burton Watson translation of his Basic Writings the story can be found in Section 17 “Autumn Floods” on pages 107-8). A frog tries to convince a turtle to join him in his wonderful well, of which he is a master. After trying to get in and getting stuck, the turtle withdraws and tells the frog instead of how deep and wide the sea is. The frog is left dumfounded. The proverb, which grew out of this Daoist fable, has come to represent a state of limited vision and even ignorance — of not being able to see outside one’s own immediate environment. Our weblogs begin from this position of humility, and we look forward to a useful and lively exchange of ideas and perspectives on the study of China.

We have a great list of starting contributers, each of whom are graduate students or professors studying China and have agreed to share some of their ideas, discoveries, and other comments online here. I will invite each of them to introduce themselves so you may learn a little more about their respective interests and background and will then add them to the list of authors in the side bar. Information on how to contact us is also available in a link from the sidebar.

Let us hope that this new weblog, which will eventually be a multilingual Chinese and English weblog, will not only make a useful contribution to online discourse about Chinese history but also catches the interest of other academics who may have yet made the plunge to share their thoughts and research directly online. For those who are interested, below is a more detailed description of the goals, audience, and content for this weblog.
Continue reading →

Self-Intro: K. M. Lawson

My name is Konrad Mitchell Lawson. I have recently finished my first year of a PhD in history and I am currently spending the summer in Seoul to work on my Korean. My research interests relate to treason, traitors, and the aftermath of war in modern East Asia. I’m also very interested in issues of historiography, colonialism, and nationalism.

Before returning to history as a PhD student, I completed a masters degree in International Affairs and continued what was then primarily an interest in the history of Sino-Japanese relations as a research student in Tokyo for a year and a half. I have also spent a few years studying languages in China and Japan.

I will be posting in English but will frequently include quotes from various sources in Chinese, occasionally with translations. Feel free to comment in Chinese or English. For those who want to read more, you can visit my personal weblog here. I am also the host and administrator of Frog In a Well and welcome your comments on how to improve our project in the future.

Michael Wert – Self intro

I’m a Ph.D candidate in the history department at UC Irvine currently doing dissertation research in Tokyo. I work on the historical memory of the Meiji Restoration, in particular how different people from 1868 to the present appropriate and create the image of Oguri Tadamasa, a Tokugawa ‘martyr’ during the Restoration. How do they appropriate him? For what reasons? How do people offer alternatives to accepted master narratives of the Restoration by using Oguri’s story? These are some of the issues I deal with in my dissertation.

I’m also interested in the spread of martial arts among commoners during the bakumatsu period. This project I started several years ago and continue to gather materials for the future.

Sasakawa Money

Antti Leppänen has written about the controversy in Korea over Yonsei’s acceptance of money from the Sasakawa Foundation. See Hankyoreh’s english editorial on the “outrageous excuses” of the university in response and how there is the danger that “the academy risks becoming a den of profiteers instead of a hall of scholarship.”

Sasakawa Ryoichi, d. 1995, is a rather nasty right wing figure. There is so much about the man, it is hard to know where to start. He associated with wartime racketeering in occupied China, was a leader of the black uniformed fascist 国粋大衆党 (New York Times obituary uses the English “Patriotic Masses Party”), the owner of a private air-force of 20 bombers for use in wartime China, made a famous 1939 bomber flight to Italy in order to pose for pictures with Mussolini (who he allegedly described as a “a first-class person, the perfect fascist and dictator.”), single-handedly dominated postwar boat racing and gambling, was a friend, financial supporter and advisor to the Moonies, and had elaborate ties to the underworld. He spent three or four years in Sugamo prison as a Class A war criminal suspect (there is a claim by his supporters that he volunteered to be included, I don’t know the facts) and was apparently cellmates in Sugamo prison with former Prime minister Kishi Nobosuke (mug shot) and had very close connections to the infamous underworld figure and right-winger Kodama Yoshio. I’m also interested in rumors he was connected somehow to my favorite traitorous villain Kawashima Yoshiko, the adopted Manchurian princess known as the “Beauty in Man’s Attire.” Sasakawa served in the wartime Diet from 1942 and one of his two brothers was an LDP Diet member. Ryoichi continued various right wing and anti-Communist activities throughout his life. According to the NYT obituary, in 1978 he said in an interview that, “All my critics are red, or jealous, or else spiteful because I didn’t give them money.” If you want to read more, in 1997 his prison diaries were published and are still in print, there are some articles here, and this hilarious article about him in the Newsletter of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation called “Ryoichi Sasakawa – who makes us question what the Japanese should be”

However, the foundations established in his name pour money into Japan related research as well as humanitarian projects all over Asia and Africa. Antti admits to accepting Sasakawa money to work on his PhD thesis and I too have accepted the “tainted” war criminal’s money in 1997 along with a Danish friend of mine through a Scandinavia-Japan culture scholarship they offer. This money helped defray our living costs at the Inter-University Center in Yokohama where we both studied Japanese.

I have to confess I was somewhat uneasy about accepting the money at the time, but I don’t think I would have any doubts about it today. Ethical issues like this related to funding arise in many situations but despite the despicable ideas and actions of the original source of the money, I think this is probably one of the clearer cut cases for me. Like many other projects funded by his money, we are not obligated in any way to continue, support, or I believe even remotely legitimate the ideas and actions of the man. Unlike Jimmy Carter, who apparently also got quite a bit of money and support from the man to support his policies, none of us need to go jogging with the deceased scoundrel to show our gratitude.

In Learning Places and History’s Disquiet, scholars such as Harry Harootunian have discussed the many problems associated with academic funding and area studies in general. While I don’t agree with all aspects of this critique, it brings up important questions. I have recently heard a number of disturbing stories related to funding ethics involving certain Asia related programs in the US where some supporting institutions influence research topics, ask that their favorite (and occasionally controversial) native academics be given visiting scholar support, and in many other ways force professors or departments to participate in the legitimation of certain nationalistic or extremely politically charged mandates. Staying just on the US side, I cited one small example of the close connection between the US military and China academic studies in the US that I came across in my own studies on my own blog here.

I don’t think we have that kind of case with Sasakawa money, at least not some of the scholarships that Antti and I have taken advantage of. This is, however, and important issue and one which especially touches academic programs doing research on a particular country or region. Your own anecdotes and thoughts are welcome.

Savage Minds

Just wanted to mention that there is a new academic group blog in town dedicated to Anthropology. Like Frog in a Well, Savage Minds is maintained by a number of PhD students and professors in the field and is aimed at bringing its study to a wider audience as well as discussing the latest research in the field.

The spread of academic group blogs is exciting and will hopefully continue as more graduate students and professors realize the uses for the medium. On that note, I want to mention that Frog in the Well will also be expanding in a few days as we get our China history group blog underway. Stay tuned.

Updates: Textbook and Constitutional revision

The Tri-national textbook I wrote about here has been published. The South Koreans, at least, are taking it pretty seriously [via Ralph Luker], with national distribution in the works.

The Constitutional revision question I wrote about here has expanded, apparently, to include the gender equity clauses, which are being blamed by social conservatives for “promoting egoism… collapse of family and community … a plunging marriage rate, an anemic birthrate and increasing delinquency in schools.” (OK, I followed it pretty well up to the last one: anyone who wants to explain to me the connection between gender equality and educational disorder is welcome to try)

Non Sequitur: A virtual gallery of Japanese Manhole Covers [via Ralph Luker] reveals some extraordinary public art. Now, can anyone tell me how this began, or why Japan does this and nobody else, as far as I know, does? Or is the US the only country whose underground access portal covers are boring?

History Carnival #9 is a rich collection (in spite of finals, it’s been a fine fortnight), including Craig’s essay (it’s much to substantial to be just “a post”) on Karate, which Sharon Howard graciously (and accurately, I think) calls “one of the outstanding posts of the month.” I will be talking about historians in cyberspace at ASPAC, and I’m grateful that I have so much to work with.

Holdouts, or Leftovers

Second Update: Disregard This Post
The Japanese government is now (late Sunday) pretty sure [thanks again, Jerry] that the reports are a hoax, a ruse by the Moro Liberation Front to attract Japanese into their territory for hostage-taking purposes. Nobody, official or otherwise, has spoken directly to any of the supposed holdouts directly, and attempts at contact have been suspiciously interrupted. It is worth noting that the names were apparently genuine, and the men whose identities were being used had living relatives in Japan (who will be, I’m sure, deeply disappointed by this news, as they were reportedly elated before), so it’s possible the Moro were working from recovered WWII era documents.

Original Post:
It’s been widely reported (NYTimes and Mainichi [thanks to Jerry West]) that former Japanese soldiers may have been identified on the Philipine island of Mindanao. In fact, according to the Mainichi report, there may be as many as sixty former Imperial soldiers living there, under the protection of (and in collaboration with?) the Moro people and their Liberation Front.

Details are still sketchy, but it doesn’t look to me as though this is a case like the last one (31 years ago) of someone who doesn’t know the war is over. This is a group of soldiers who may or may not have known the war was over immediately, but who clearly settled down as a group. If it turns out that they were important in training the Moro Liberationists, that would be interesting (I can’t, offhand, think of another case where former Japanese soldiers got invovled in other peoples’ liberation movements, unless you count the pseudo-alliance with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists against the CCP after formal surrender), but that’s a different story.

First Update: Konrad and I posted on this almost simultaneously, and he has more links than I do. Pravda [thanks, Ralph] is reporting that the two men found were indeed unaware of the end of the war and concerned about courts-martial on their return. Konrad’s links, though, make it clear that the Japanese government has not yet had direct contact with the men, and it is unknown how or why they remained in the Philippines this long. We shall see.

To be honest, I wasn’t sure if I wanted to bother posting on this: I’m still trying to figure out how this is historically interesting. It’s a curiousity, to be sure, but not a new thing. It’s a potentially powerful story, indeed, but I’m having trouble seeing that it is going to add much to what we already know about WWII Japan and Japanese, about the Pacific war and post-war development, about human nature or human societies. If anyone wants to suggest interesting historical questions to which these men and their experience might hold answers, I’m all ears.

More Former Japanese Soldiers

There has been some news in the last two days about the possibility that two more Japanese soldiers left behind in the Philippines being “discovered” on the island of Mindanao. The Japanese government apparently set up a meeting with them to be held today, Saturday May 28th but they failed to show. While there is a lot of uncertainty on the details, especially since the two are said to be in an area where anti-government rebels are active, they may be a Yamakawa Yoshio 山川吉雄さん(aged 87) and Nakauchi Tsuzuki 中内続喜 (aged 85) who were both presumed dead. They are reported to be in good health and desire to return to Japan.

It seems likely, however, that this will not be as spectacular as some of the previous cases from the 1960s and 1970s where soldiers didn’t even know the war was over. At least one report says these soldiers may have been afraid to reveal themselves due to their fear of court martial.

Yomiuri’s report on this is here, and you can read two articles at Asahi here and here. Sankei claims that there is information on as many as 40 Japanese former soldiers possible alive on the island. Mainichi has an article with more background on the unit in which these two particular soldiers may have served. There is an Associated Press article in English available here. There are also a few pictures in a Yahoo slide show available here. Another article in English over at the Japan Times (thx to Nichi Nichi). BBC report is here.

I’ll keep this posting open and add more article links as I come across them, or as they are mentioned in comments to this posting. Since so little is known at this point it is too early to comment too much, but one thing strikes me as curious. If, as some of the articles indicate, information about these soldiers was available last August, and an investigation was done in December of last year, and the Japanese government involved at least since February, I find the timing of this revelation and the meeting setup just slightly suspicious. Since we are approaching the 60th anniversary of the end of the war, having lots of media reports about the tragic stories of soldiers left in places like the Philippines will certainly take some of the steam away from reports discussing the more problematic legacies of the conflict, both domestically in Japan and in terms of its relationship with other Asian countries. While there is nothing problematic about the “bring the boys back home” feelings generated by incidents like this, and the emotional reunions that follow, they are also heavily loaded events that often get radically de-contextualized in the media reports that followed.

細谷千博、『シベリア出兵の史的研究』

We recently covered the book、『シベリア出兵の史的研究』(細谷千博、岩波現代文庫、2005) in my class. Unfortunately, I couldn’t attend the first class, so I’ll make some comments on the latter half of this book. The book tries to address what it calls the “doubled diplomatic posture” (二重外交) of Japan’s politicians. In this case the writer is mainly discussing Japan’s military expedition to Siberia. The most interesting and controversial part of this book, I think, is found in chapter 6. It’s discusses a debate between Hara Kei and Ito Miyoji. It describes how Ito Miyoji persuaded and prevailed against Hara Kei. The debate proceeds mostly through passages taken from the 外交調査会. As you may know, Hara Kei was strongly opposed to the シベリア出兵(Siberian expedition). It was a big concern at the time of how to persuade him not to object to Ito’s plan.
There’re several narrations and explanations of it, I’ll give you some sentences that I couldn’t understand easily. In a scene during which Ito and Hara adjusted their opinions (p.196-197), Ito gave an amendment of his asnwer to Hara.
 「一、チェツク軍支援ノ為緩急ニ応シ浦塩以外ノ方面ニ出兵スル事。
  二、形勢ノ発展次第ニ依リ更ニ増援ヲ必要トスルコトアルヘキ事。」
Hara wanted Ito to erase these two sentences as was to be anticipated , but Ito instead presented Hara with a slightly different one.
「 チェツク軍支援ノ為浦塩以外ニ出動シ且ツ形勢ノ発展ニ伴ヒ増援スルノ必要アルヘキヲ予想シ欣然応諾スルト共ニ宣言書案ニ関スル米国政府ノ所見ヲ尊重スルノ意ヲ表明ス。」
Hara agreed to this revision, and Ito thus won the tug of war. I don’t quite understand how these two sentences are substantially different. As you already know and may have experienced yourselves in Japan, 言い回し is common in ordinary life and even in diplomatic text and speaking. You can also see many 言い回し in this textbook. One of my goals is to better understand this kind of 言い回し found in diplomatic or other scenes throughout Japanese history, especially from the end of the Edo through to our present day.

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